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SUMMARY: This article argues that during the formative years of the colonial state
in Ghana, European employers established new collaborative mechanisms with
African intermediaries for the purpose of expanding the modern mining sector.
They were forced to do so on account of severe labour-market limitations,
resulting primarily from the slow death of slavery and debt bondage. These
intermediaries, or ‘‘headmen’’, were engaged because of their apparent affluence and
authority in their home villages, from which they recruited mineworkers. However,
allegiances between them and managers in the Tarkwa gold mines considerably slowed
the pace towards free labour. Indeed, a system in which managers reinforced economic
coercion and repressive relationships of social dependency between Africans,
allocating African labour contractors fixed positions of power, resulted from the
institutionalization of purportedly traditional processes of labour recruitment into
the modern market.
During the ‘‘industrialization’’ of gold mining in colonial Ghana at the
turn of the nineteenth century, after two decades of a vexing labour
shortage and one disastrous attempt at the large-scale import of indentured
labourers from elsewhere in the British Empire, mine managers around
Tarkwa finally felt compelled to pull in migrant labourers from various
enclaves of West Africa. Modern forms of mining would in future rely
strictly on African labourers. Several of these men arrived in the interior
* Previous versions of this article were presented at the African Economic History Workshop
held on 2–3 May 2011 at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva, and at the 4th European Conference on African Studies, Uppsala, 15–18 June 2011.
I would like to thank Jan-Georg Deutsch, Deborah Mason, Alexander Thiesen, and Rouven
Kunstmann for their comments. I gratefully acknowledge the Janggen-Po¨hn Foundation in
Switzerland for research support.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000405
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. WWZ Bibliothek, on 05 Aug 2019 at 08:51:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
mining district in search of wage jobs from the nearby coastal regions of the
colony and its protectorates. Others had travelled from remote villages in
Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The Fante, Apollonians, Moshi, Krepi,
Wangara, Basa, Kru, Vai, Yoruba, Hausa, Mende, and Timmani were among
the social groups turning up in the mining towns.
A considerable number of these young men did not enter modern
worksites on an individual contract basis. Rather, they served as members
of a gang of roughly twenty-five men, each gang being recruited by and
subcontracted to a headman from a shared home village or region. Various
scholars have observed that in British West African colonies, the slow
death of slavery and debt bondage overlapped with a period of rapid
industrialization, often leading to the incorporation of traditional institutions
of labour mobilization into large-scale industry.1 Carolyn Brown has
demonstrated that to get hold of ‘‘free’’ labour to serve the construction of
the railway from Port Harcourt to Enugu in colonial Nigeria during the
labour scarcity of World War I, managers frequently went through village
authorities for recruits ‘‘under the assumption that requests through ‘native
chiefs’ would be accepted by their subjects who, it was alleged, were
accustomed to serving their customary labour needs’’.2
This article aims to shed new light on the industrial labour history of
Ghana by exploring the system arising from the formal subsumption of
such coercive patterns into colonial commodity capitalism during a boom
period in the mining industry. It investigates two sets of vertical political
relationships. Firstly, those between European mine managers and African
workers; and secondly, those between African workers, particularly
between headmen and the members of their gangs, engaged in mining for
wages as part of their livelihood. The case of indirect recruitment in
colonial Ghana demonstrates how, in defiance of an abolitionist rhetoric
that put modern commerce on a pedestal, social bondage could be just as
1. For studies on the role of African authorities, in particular chiefs, in labour mobilization for
various government services in colonial Ghana, see Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry, ‘‘Colonial
Forced Labor Policies for Road-Building in Southern Ghana and International Anti-Forced
Labor Pressures, 1900–1940’’, African Economic History, 28 (2000), pp. 1–25; idem, ‘‘‘The Loads
Are Heavier Than Usual’: Forced Labor by Women and Children in the Central Province, Gold
Coast (Colonial Ghana), ca.1900–1940’’, African Economic History, 30 (2002), pp. 31–51; idem,
‘‘African Agency and Cultural Initiatives in the British Imperial Military and Labor Recruit-
ment Drives in the Gold Coast (Colonial Ghana) During the First World War’’, African
Identities, 4 (2006), pp. 213–234; David Killingray, ‘‘Labour Mobilization in British Colonial
Africa for the War Effort, 1936–46’’, in idem and Richard Rathbone (eds), Africa and the Second
World War (London, 1986), pp. 68–96. After 1906, administrative officials increasingly made
direct arrangements with chiefs to recruit labourers from northern Ghana to serve government
services and colonial commerce.
2. This was a method known as ‘‘political labour’’ or the ‘‘local method’’; Carolyn A. Brown,
WeWere All Slaves: African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu Government Colliery
(Cape Town, 2003), p. 78.
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constraining following the region’s deeper incorporation into the global
capitalist market.
In the late 1890s, with the backing of the Foreign Office, the colonial
government in Ghana embarked on a mission of social and economic
development. As in other parts of British West Africa, particular indus-
tries were pinpointed and supported in the hope of economic prosperity.
Out of this situation mine managers also anticipated that colonial
administrators would begin to groom African workers in the ways of the
free market. By the turn of the century, the gold mining industry in Tarkwa,
previously desperately beseeching the colonial administration for additional
support in infrastructure and government services, was now suddenly a core
element in the administration’s economic agenda.3 However, the prolifera-
tion of wage labour in commercial companies was evidently taking a unique
path. During this period of economic urgency, headmen became a common
feature of the labour supply chain in Ghana’s mining sector. Not only did
these intermediaries recruit labourers, they also moved into the position of
ethnic broker, caretaker, and de facto supervisor of the members of their gang
for the entire duration of their contract.
In what follows, this article examines the transformation of African
authority once it was used for the purpose of industrial labour mobilization.
It attempts to discern the changing socio-economic position negotiated by
such intermediaries, ambiguously situated between ‘‘labour’’ and ‘‘capital’’,
by illuminating their interrelations with the aforementioned groups at
various stages of the recruitment process: starting at the point of contact in
the village, during the journey towards the mining centre, continuing
throughout the contractual period, and even anticipating the extension of
relationships between the members of a gang once they had completed a
contract, due to shared home ties. The following questions will be addressed.
What kind of authority did headmen hold over the larger population of
African workers whom they had recruited from a shared home village or
region? To what degree was such authority dictated by unwavering loyalty
versus complex social negotiations? How did African social relations interact
with the beliefs of European managers and officials? Why did managers
employ these intermediaries? Moreover, why did European employers not
simply fade them out to gain more authority over the labour market?
Methodologically, this study fits into a school of thought that regards
European collaboration with indigenous authorities as lying at the heart of
imperial policy around the globe.4 In Ghana, the expansion of industrialized
3. Raymond E. Dumett, El Dorado in West Africa: The Gold-Mining Frontier, African Labor,
and Colonial Capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875–1900 (Athens, OH [etc.], 1998), p. 289.
4. Studies exploring collaboration theory in imperial history include: Ronald Robinson, ‘‘Non-
European Foundations of European Imperialism’’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds), Studies
in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 117–140; idem, ‘‘European Imperialism and
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mining fostered, even demanded, new allegiances between Europeans
and local authorities. In turn, these new relations also influenced the
socio-economic landscape of the expanding wage labour market.
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN MIGRANT
SOCIAL RELATIONS
Migration was not a novel feature of the Ghanaian economy. Rather, the
story of the twentieth-century mining industry was one of concentrated
mass migration. Annually, several thousand labourers streamed from
their villages in remote areas of West Africa to find wage jobs in the mines
of south-west Ghana. They contributed to an estimated 15,000 African
employees in Tarkwa and Obuasi, a neighbouring mining centre, around
the first decade of the twentieth century.5 This number included casual
piecework labourers, permanently urbanized labourers, and, most of all,
subcontract labourers who were bonded by agreement for six to twelve
months. They were employed for ‘‘surface work which would include
cutting firewood, clearing bush, making excavations, moving loads, and in
the various underground duties entailed in ore-extraction’’.6 Together
they comprised a cluster of men of diverse cultural, economic, and
regional backgrounds, speaking a multitude of languages.
The list of innovative rituals, relations, and beliefs shaping migrants’
identities in the colonial mines of Africa has prompted the research of
many scholars.7 For Carola Lentz’s studies on migrant miners in Tarkwa
from northern Ghana, colonial ethnicization has been a driving force of
these new politics.8 For young male migrant labourers, life in a cosmopolitan
area was at once both invigorating and terrifying. Novelty, for example,
came in the form of newly acquired liberties and power relative to other
Indigenous Reactions in British West Africa, 1880–1914’’, in H.L. Wesseling (ed.), Expansion and
Reaction (Leiden, 1978), pp. 141–163; Anthony E. Atmore, ‘‘The Extra-European Foundations of
British Imperialism: Towards a Reassessment’’, in C.C. Eldridge (ed.), British Imperialism in the
Nineteenth Century (London, 1984), pp. 106–125; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in
World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Oxford, 2010).
5. An annual report from 1908 suggests that the number of African employees in the mining
industry ‘‘was about 15,300 of which 540 were European’’. However, the available statistics are
hardly precise; Gold Coast Departmental Report for 1908, National Archives of Ghana in
Accra [hereafter, PRAAD], ADM 5/1/17.
6. Migeod to Governor Rodgers, Semi-Official and Private Letters concerning the Transport
Department, no. 661/06, 28 April 1906, Royal Commonwealth Society Library in Cambridge,
[hereafter, RCMS], 139/10/3.
7. See for example Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in
Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860–1910 (London, 1994).
8. Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh, 2006),
pp. 1–13; idem, ‘‘Colonial Constructions and African Initiatives: The History of Ethnicity in
Northwestern Ghana’’, Ethnos, 65 (2001), pp. 107–136.
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social groups.9 Lentz demonstrates that in spite of historical tensions and
competition, groups from different localities encountered one another on a
more or less equal footing in the mining centres.10 These ‘‘new political
structures, rituals and discourses were attractive [y] to migrant workers
[y] who sought the same status and respect as colleagues [y] from pre-
colonial kingdoms’’.11 Among other guarantees, they now received equal pay
for equal work and had access to similar legal rights. In conjunction with this
shift, she contends that migrant men had simultaneously to establish
affiliations to serve and protect self-interest along lines ‘‘often containing
ethnic overtones, that emphasised ties extending beyond the boundaries of
the [y] home village’’.12
Another driving force of colonial ethnicization in the urbanizing centres
was the development of new political institutions with an ethnic identity
at their centre. These new identities were further normalized through
administrative routines led by European officials. Within this ensuing social
structure, the headman served as the spokesperson for his ethnic kin.13 He
was in charge of negotiations between ethnic groups. In addition, during
periods of occupational discontent, he was the one to voice the opinions and
grievances of his countrymen. In cases of emergencies, illness, accidents, or
death, even in ‘‘ordinary small palavers’’, he stood as their representative.14
At the same time, scholars have pointed out that he was in the service of, and
accountable to, the European mine managers.15
Yet, more than a few studies analysing miners’ identities in colonial
Africa highlight that they were not dictated by innovation alone, but that
older modes of social organization continued to guide the way in which
they organized themselves. For instance, D.T. Moodie argues that migrant
gold miners on the Witwatersrand imported into modern enterprise a
moral order from home. They constructed ‘‘new life-worlds out of
fragments of the old’’.16 Similarly, William Beinart emphasizes that many
9. Lentz states that in colonial Ghana ‘‘ethnicization’’ within migrant populations paralleled
changes within broader society; Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of History, pp. 2–3.
10. Ibid., p. 34.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 2.
13. Carola Lentz and Veit Erlmann, ‘‘A Working Class in Formation? Economic Crisis and
Strategies of Survival among Dagara Mine Workers in Ghana’’, Cahiers d’E´tudes Africaines, 29
(1989), pp. 69–111, 95; Carola Lentz, ‘‘The Chief, the Mine Captain and the Politician:
Legitimating Power in Northern Ghana’’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute,
68 (1998), pp. 46–67, 64.
14. ‘‘Aufargah Mutiny’’, Letter Book, 9 October 1903, RCMS 139/4/30.
15. Lentz and Erlmann, ‘‘A Working Class in Formation?’’, p. 95; Jeff Crisp, The Story of an
African Working Class: Ghanaian Miners’ Struggles, 1870–1980 (London [etc.], 1984), pp. 9–10, 76.
16. T. Dunbar Moodie with Vivienne Ndatshe, Going for Gold: Men, Mines, and Migration
(Berkeley, CA [etc.], 1994), p. 42.
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other groups of migrant workers in South Africa ‘‘retained deep roots’’
that continued to influence identity and self-organization.17 The con-
nection to older forms of a socio-political order was not solely abstract
either. In her study of industrial coal miners in Nigeria, Carolyn Brown
illustrates the persistence of an intimate connection to social hierarchies in
the home villages. ‘‘Both the state and the industry used men whom they
designated as local ‘leaders’ to control their populations.’’18 Following
similar observations in Ghana, Jeff Crisp recorded that, for European
employers, ‘‘the easiest and most satisfactory way of dealing with Africans’’
was through African authorities.19 Older institutions rooted in the context of
a rural environment continued not only to influence migrants’ identity and
self-organization on a personal level, but also the operative system of labour
regulation within modern mining companies.
Still, in the existing literature on Ghana’s industrial history there is
little mention of social hierarchies among migrants that predated their
arrival in these urban areas. The business activities of headmen outside the
mines, i.e. their roles as labour recruiters and contractors, are rarely
discussed.20 The discussion of colonial ethnicization, with its ‘‘new forms
of classification and self-understanding’’,21 has apparently overshadowed
socio-political relationships that may have cut across ethnically homo-
genous groups in the mines, and that had roots in older power structures
and institutions visible across the rainforests, savannas, and deserts of
West Africa.
Closely related to the subject of continuities of power structures during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is, naturally, abolition.22
Around this period, the lives of African workers were under two trajectories
of major transformation. Firstly, there was the slow death of slavery and debt
bondage. The abolition of the legal status of slaves was granted in 1874.
However, following a tradition of scholars who have regarded emancipation
17. William Beinart, ‘‘Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: The
Experiences of a South African Migrant, 1930–1960’’, in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds),
The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa (London, 1990),
pp. 286–309, 305. See also Charles Van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern
Rhodesia, 1900–1933 (London, 1976).
18. Brown, We Were All Slaves, p. 97.
19. J. Dickinson, Notes for the Guidance of Europeans in the Gold Coast (Accra, 1939), cited in
Crisp, The Story of an African Working Class, p. 69.
20. Lentz and Erlmann mention, but do not elaborate on, the provision of job opportunities for
new migrants by headmen; Lentz and Erlmann, ‘‘A Working Class in Formation?’’, p. 102.
21. Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of History, p. 6.
22. Gareth Austin discusses the limited attention being paid to the subject of abolition in the
field of West African economic history in his ‘‘Cash Crops and Freedom: Export Agriculture
and the Decline of Slavery in Colonial West Africa’’, International Review of Social History, 54
(2009), pp. 1–37, 2.
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as an uneven and slow transformation, Trevor Getz has argued that this
‘‘watered-down’’ piece of legislation ‘‘resulted for most slaves only in a
gradual re-evaluation of dependent status rather than massive liberations’’.23
Further, Getz advanced the notion that political ties between European
colonial officials and African authorities were a crucial motivation to the
dilution of emancipatory legislation. During the era of emancipation,
colonial administrators were, according to him, acutely aware of their
need for the support of African authorities in political and military
matters in the colonies.24 Thus, just as the reliance of African authorities
on the British for military support had quelled violent uprisings in
the aftermath of the emancipation proclamation, in turn the British
colonial government put forward the pretence of radical transformation in
the metropolitan areas whilst maintaining their political allegiances to the
same group of African elites for whom slave ownership continued to be
integral to wealth, status, and power.25
On a perspective that coincides with Getz’s in time and concept, Peter
Haenger asserts that along with a colonial administration that unsuc-
cessfully attempted to ‘‘steer a middle course’’ in dealing with the issue of
slavery, other groups of Europeans in colonial Ghana were equally baffled
by the complexities of realizing emancipation.26 In particular, he portrays
the Basel missionaries as often lacking a straightforward strategy in
dealing with the liberation of slaves as they encountered resistance from
among their own group of religious followers.
Ronald Robinson, an original voice on the subject of collaborative
relationships between Africans and Europeans, has stated explicitly
that colonial rule was built upon neither hegemony nor control. More
accurately, he declared that it hinged on the establishment of collaborative
mechanisms between the British and indigenous peoples. However,
economic relationships in Africa, and for that matter also in Asia,
were essentially undifferentiated from socio-political ones.27 Thus, here,
collaboration was not ‘‘in the export-import sector but among essentially
non-commercial, ruling oligarchies and landholding elites’’.28 Therefore, it
23. Trevor R. Getz, Slavery and Reform in West Africa: Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-
Century Senegal and the Gold Coast (Oxford, 2004), p. 160.
24. Ibid., pp. 56, 113.
25. Ibid., pp. 111–117. Other colonial governments around Africa took an equally ambiguous
stance on ending slavery and debt bondage. For late nineteenth-century East Africa, Deutsch
demonstrates that the institution of slavery was hardly challenged, and even supported, by the
German colonial government in Tanganyika; Jan-Georg Deutsch, Emancipation without
Abolition in German East Africa, c.1884–1914 (Oxford, 2006), pp. 97–144.
26. Peter Haenger, Slaves and Slave Holders on the Gold Coast: Towards an Understanding of
Social Bondage in West Africa (Basel, 2000), pp. x, 61–102.
27. Robinson, ‘‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism’’, pp. 129–130.
28. Ibid.
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is hardly unusual that with the expansion of the industrial wage labour
market, the second major trajectory of transformation, European
employers established collaborative relationships with men who they
believed already held enough authority to mobilize others.29 Given their
apparent affluence in their home regions, powerful African intermediaries
were hired as labour recruiters and contractors to produce wage labourers
for the industrial gold mines around the Tarkwa area.
For the period 1900 to 1906, it is useful to distinguish between larger
political bodies formed mainly according to European design in the context
of the mines, i.e. the councils, from smaller groups of socially homogenous
gangs whose formation predated their arrival at the mines. To examine social
relations within these smaller ‘‘gang’’ units, this article moves beyond the
topic of ethnicity to compare the gang system with older institutions for
labour mobilization.
RELATIONS BETWEEN ‘‘CONTRACT BOYS ’’ 3 0
AND HEADMEN
Associations between headmen and labourers may have been temporary
in a professional sense, but in most cases their personal relationship
extended far beyond the setting of the gold mines. Some headmen may
have already been in the employment of industrial mines before setting
off on the lengthy journey of labour recruitment. Nevertheless, they all
initiated the ‘‘collection’’, or ‘‘shepherding’’, of migrant workers in their
rural home region.31 Though they may have shared similar lifestyles in
that environment, by the time a gang reached the urban workplace dis-
tinctions between a headman and his labourers were evident and visible
even in dress. The headman was in Western clothing: cotton T-shirt, full-
length trousers, and cloth cap so typical of a contemporary industrial
worker;32 typical ‘‘unskilled’’ workers, in turn, were still sighted in loin-
cloths and traditional cloth garb.33 Many of the recruits chosen to engage
in the tasks of drudgery and menial labour would have been young men
29. Writing about various types of labour recruiters in India, Tirthankar Roy explains that the
ensuing imperfect wage markets ‘‘[created] space for individuals already enjoying economic or
political power of some kind to try to become monopolistic suppliers’’; Tirthankar Roy,
‘‘Sardars, Jobbers, Kanganies: The Labour Contractor and Indian Economic History’’, Modern
Asian Studies, 42 (2008), pp. 971–998, 978.
30. For an original usage of this term, see ‘‘Inspector General of Police v. Seiden Wangara’’,
July 1918, PRAAD, ADM 27/4/60, pp. 276–277.
31. These contemporary terms were used to describe the system of indirect recruitment serving
the mines.
32. See Figure 1.
33. For an image of ‘‘unskilled’’ Liberian and Ghanaian labourers in Ghana around 1895–1905,
see Dumett, El Dorado, p. 260.
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Figure 1. Kru headman on the Gold Coast (c.1876–1877).
National Archives of the UK: ref. CO1069/29/34. Used with permission.
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belonging to a more socially vulnerable class of the community, or
possibly even former or current slaves.34
In sum, labourers would likely have felt an obligation to their headman
that surpassed modern-day employer–employee relationships. Just as some
chiefs regularly managed to call on their followers for communal labour
within the corve´e system, so too social pressure could be utilized to mobilize
industrial workers.35 However, European imaginings of submissive African
subjects failed to capture this relationship in its full complexity. A headman
gained only a small fraction of his authority by virtue of a natural and self-
affirmed affiliation between him and the labourers rooted in home ties.
Indeed, indigenous economic institutions that could enforce coercive labour
arrangements were far more vital to the amelioration of the pervasive labour
scarcity, as seen in the widespread use of credit for the purpose of industrial
recruitment.
Polly Hill shows that credit relationships were an integral part of rural-
based economic production and development in parts of West Africa
going back to ‘‘time immemorial’’.36 Borrowing between farmer-traders
was indeed an extension of the social hierarchy. Those individuals who
had available surplus became creditors whilst the remaining population
became debtors in order to raise starting capital for their enterprises. Such
credit relationships were established in many forms, and were settled in an
equally diverse number of ways.37 For example, one of the patterns by
34. Dumett posits that some of the ‘‘generalized’’ barriers to long-term permanent wage labour for
local labourers were even stronger for industrial mining. He gives three key reasons for this
aversion, which was rooted in historical socio-cultural beliefs. Firstly, during the nineteenth century
it was a taboo for the Akan to mine for gold. Rather, especially for the more dangerous tasks, they
employed slaves. Secondly, there was a general awareness that mining was still an extremely dan-
gerous occupation. Thirdly, even during pre-colonial times, the bulk of the workforce in the mines
were migrants. These hindrances, along with the fact that no resources had to be exchanged upfront,
speak to a higher proportion of local men from the poorest classes of society being extended credit
to serve as wage labourers, relative to those who were granted credit for rural-based economic
activities; Dumett, El Dorado, pp. 144–148; Polly Hill, Development Economics on Trial: The
Anthropological Case for a Prosecution (Cambridge, 1986), p. 83; idem, TheMigrant Cocoa-Farmers
of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism (Oxford, 1997), p. 186.
35. For the pre-colonial period in parts of Ghana, corve´e was used for everything from gold
mining to agricultural labour and road maintenance; Gareth Austin, Labour, Land, and Capital
in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807–1956 (Rochester, NY, 2005), pp. 112,
185–189; Dumett, El Dorado, pp. 71–72; idem, ‘‘Precolonial Gold Mining and the State in the
Akan Region: With a Critique of the Terray Hypothesis’’, Research in Economic Anthropology,
2 (1979), pp. 37–68, 44–47.
36. Hill, Development Economics on Trial, ch. 8.
37. Hill describes some ways in which loans were executed by rural dwellers: through the
supply of temporarily borrowed farms, grains for the harvest, short-term loans for trading
expeditions, produce to be sold for profit, animals for transportation to trading sites, and the
mortgaging of farms to gain starting capital for business activities; Hill, Development Economics
on Trial, pp. 89–90.
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which poorer debtors repaid richer creditors was in non-monetary form,
as in labour. Hill recognized that, ‘‘Grain may be granted to farm
labourers who repay, over a period, in terms of work’’.38
Nonetheless, just as the number of credit relationships increased with
commercial expansion,39 so did the variety of their manifestations.
Relevant here is the adaptation of such credit schemes for urban-based
economies during the early colonial period as debtors were routinely
recruited as wage labourers for large-scale mining. In order to engage
twenty-five men for wage work in the urbanizing areas, it was often
necessary for headmen to first loosen their economic constraints in the
home villages. Before a gang could depart, it was therefore expected that
the labour recruiter would provide each man with an advance payment.
These funds were ‘‘primarily for the purpose of paying his debts (not for
supporting his family) as otherwise his creditors, and natives have cred-
itors, would not allow leave’’, remarked one European official.40 Settling
debts with local creditors granted large groups of indebted young men the
mobility to pursue work for cash beyond the confinement of their home
villages in order to improve their social status, among a broad spectrum of
ambitions. Nevertheless, a migrant’s debts were never simply written off.
This financial exchange was rather equivalent to a switching of patrons.
Assuming the workers’ debts, often amounting to several British
pounds per individual, was invariably an expensive and risky business.
Yet, it allowed the headman-creditor to solidify his authority over the
members of his gang. He now possessed the power of economic coercion
over them. To be more precise, it served the headman by compelling a
recruit to continually sell his labour power in the mines until the debt had
been paid off in its entirety.41 Since in actuality the terms of lending
38. In addition to labour, repayment could occur in monetary form, or through produce and
products; ibid., p. 89.
39. For studies confirming the positive relationships between the availability of ‘‘trust’’, or
credit, systems between Europeans and Africans and the spread of commerce in West Africa,
see ibid., pp. 89–90; Martin Lynn, Commerce and Economic Change in West Africa: The Palm
Oil Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 67–68; Ray Kea, Settlements,
Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast (Baltimore, MD, 1982).
40. ‘‘Memorandum on the Concession Labour Bill’’ enclosed in Confidential dispatch, William
B. Griffith to F.W.H. Migeod, No. case 714, 25 March 1904, RCMS 139/12/11.
41. The coercive nature of this system should not undermine the fact that many labourers
decided to work voluntarily. Nor should it overshadow the fact that many African workers
were driven by more crippling economic pressures. For example, for those men from the border
regions of French West African colonies in particular, the pressure to work for wages pre-
dominantly stemmed from the poll tax imposed by their colonial government. In spite of efforts
by French administrative officials to keep such men within their administrative boundaries as a
pool for forced labour, migrants made their way to Ghana, where wages were higher, allowing
them to pay their taxes and still have enough money left over to participate in economic
activities such as trade; Austin, Labour, Land, and Capital, pp. 401–402.
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seemed to have largely rested in the headman’s hands, he could spread the
period of repayment, during which he gradually deducted this sum along
with other fees and fines from his men’s wages, as he saw fit (but likely
with the limitation of a few months).42 Although it is uncertain what
amount of capital headmen possessed before their service engagement, the
prevalence of this form of inducement to labour indicates that, at the very
least, when he was in need of cash, mine managers were eager to provide
him with enough money to conduct recruitment activities seamlessly.
There is further documentation of African employers in the timber
industry taking a similar approach to recruit labourers.43 In addition to
such capital tying labourers to headmen, once they used it to pay off their
pre-existing debts, young men incurred additional debts during their
journey to the mines.
There is no evidence that in the course of migration any labourers
travelled with much, if any, remuneration. Firstly, potentially severe
transportation costs, as required by travelling by train in 1903, for
example, were initially the headman’s responsibility, though they were
later deducted from the workers’ wages.44 Secondly, small rations of fresh
produce, grain, and water45 were of limited use for what could range from
several days to weeks of trekking on foot over hundreds of kilometres, or
travelling for several days upon a German steamer, as was usually the case
for labourers from Liberia. Therefore, in contrast to the self-financed
journey home,46 during which migrant workers usually had to purchase
their own food and water and pay their own fares,47 a headman would
42. It was also routine to wait until labourers had reached the mines before assigning them a
concrete rate of pay; Migeod to Governor Rodgers, 28 April 1906.
43. ‘‘Quow Hammah v. Mahoma Nuhu’’, Criminal and Civil Record Book, District Com-
missioner’s Court, 1894, PRAAD, ADM 27/4/41, pp. 39–42. Hammah testified: ‘‘I live at
Abosso and I am a petty trader and I am also a contractor for firewood for the Abosso
Company. One the Wednesday last I counted £24 [intended to be given] to a man Quamina
Amman to take to the coast to advance labourers.’’
44. For example, one colonial official declared, ‘‘the cost of the steamer and the headmoney [for
the Liberian government] is usually and properly paid by the employer. Sometimes, however, it
is deducted from the men’s wages’’; Migeod to Governor Rodgers, 28 April 1906.
45. In 1914, an administrative official reported witnessing many gangs en route to Kumasi.
They ‘‘are usually conducted by a native who had been to Kumasi before, and their members
each carried with them a scanty supply of food and very little else’’; Report on the Northern
Territories, ‘‘Immigration and Emigration’’, Gold Coast Departmental Report for 1914,
PRAAD, ADM 5/1/23.
46. Even Kru labourers who were imported by steamboats were responsible for their own
return fares.
47. The colonial administration was concerned with the effect that rising food prices would
have on the flow of migrant labourers into Ghana. The voyage home could be especially
precarious. ‘‘During the dry season a soldier on his way to Kumasi on leave from Northern
Nigeria informed [the District Commissioner] on his arrival that he had paid no less a sum
than £2 for water since he had entered the Protectorate at Bawku’’; Report on the Northern
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also have been expected to offer the aforementioned provisions in sub-
sistence and travel. Offerings of this kind ensured the labourers’ arrival in
a good healthy condition. At the very least, gang members had to be
strong and energized enough to contribute to the building of their own
housing, which they were permitted three days on full pay to complete.48
The relationship of dependency that was established with indirect recruit-
ment eventually carried over into the subcontracting period.
Formal sources of credit stemming from European employers eventually
became entangled with the financial institutions established between
Africans. Before embarking on a single day’s work, or even witnessing
conditions in the mines first hand, labourers were getting themselves deeper
in debt by around 20 shillings.49 In this case, the cash was a straightforward
economic incentive, and could be spent arbitrarily. Administrative reports
noted that men from the urban coastal regions of Ghana found offers
of this kind particularly attractive, despite the negative impact on their
final wages. It was evident that, ‘‘£2 a month with an advance of 20/- is
more desirable than £2.10/- a month with no advance’’.50 Many companies
even used competitive advances of up to 30 shillings, far surpassing the 10
shillings suggested by the administration, to attract workers.51 The accep-
tance of such credit stood as a ratifying seal of approval upon a worker’s
consent to serve.52
Nevertheless, there was a more dubious side to this competition since
labour recruiters frequently used these cash advances to induce desertion
from competing concessions. This tactic may have been fair game for the
recruitment of casual labourers. However, secret talks had to be held with
the highly favoured ‘‘agreement boys’’. The ensuing conversation mir-
rored parts of the negotiation process that would have occurred in the
home villages. The covering of debts, future wages, transportation costs,
lifestyles on site, and the supply of advances were initial items to be
settled out of the earshot of potential informers to local management.53
Territories, ‘‘Immigration and Emigration’’, Gold Coast Departmental Report for 1914,
PRAAD, ADM 5/1/23.
48. Migeod to Governor Rodgers, 28 April 1906.
49. Griffith to Migeod, 25 March 1904.
50. ‘‘Concession Labour Ordinance’’, Letter Book, Sekondi, 3 December 1903, RCMS 139/4/57.
51. Ibid.
52. Often when a labourer was brought before the court and charged with desertion it was
emphasized that he had not only entered into contract with a particular mine, but also that he
had accepted an advance of a given amount.
53. For example, during the hearing of one allegedly illicit recruiter, the ‘‘underground boy’’
Albert Kofi testified: ‘‘I know Bonsa Kwamin the accused. I knew him a week ago. Accused
came to me and asked me if I worked. I told him yes. He said he wanted people to work on
timber with him and that they would get plenty of money to pay our debts. Seven of us went
with him. He advanced us one pound each. We gave him, accused, a paper for the advance.
Collaboration in the Ghana Gold Mining Industry, 1900–1906 29
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000405
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. WWZ Bibliothek, on 05 Aug 2019 at 08:51:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
This apparently pricey service was a low cost to bear for mine managers
since, as shown above, the wages of those miners who had accepted
advances were appropriately adjusted and lowered. However, this calcu-
lation panned out only after roughly two to three months of continual
work; ultimately employee retention was key. In all this, general man-
agement delegated to the headman the difficult and murky undertaking of
tracking the multiple balances carried by each of the members of his gang.
African authorities, officially insignificant auxiliaries to management,
hereby mediated a share of the formal payment structures, another credit-
based system.
Mine management may have preferred written contracts under the
Master and Servant Ordinance of 1893, yet, before 1906, most contracts
were still ‘‘under hand’’,54 and for the length of their six to twelve month
contracts mineworkers were subject to extended payment. This meant
that they simply did not ‘‘draw their pay until the final completion of
their contract’’.55 In the meantime, similar to older forms of dependency
that existed with the institution of nineteenth-century slavery or debt
bondage, labourers acquired clothes, small sums of money, and other
items by bargaining with their headmen.56 This method of extended pay-
ments not only strengthened relationships of dependency by temporarily
putting the labourers in the seat of ‘‘creditor’’, it also gave mine managers
some peace of mind on the issue of retention. In 1903, one administrative
official concluded that ‘‘a labourer does not desert when he has some money
standing in his credit, except the provocation on part of his employer be
unendurable; and there being no monthly payment in his case he does not
take two or three days off after pay day to enjoy himself’’.57
Yet, there remained some room for manoeuvre. Rather than depending
strictly on allowances from their headmen, some workers managed to
His clerk told us we would not get a full advance from accused. He refused to pay our train
here. We asked him to pay what the mine at Tarquah owed us when we left at his request. He
complained to the F.M. at Abosso and he sent us all to the police. Accused spoke to me first at
Tarquah and said if I left the mine we would get plenty of money on timberwork’’ ;‘‘Inspector
General of Police v. Bonsa Kwamin’’, Criminal and Civil Record Book, District Commis-
sioner’s Court, 1919, PRAAD, ADM 27/4/61, pp. 223, 25; ‘‘Inspector General of Police v. Mana
Wangara’’, Criminal and Civil Record Book, District Commissioner’s Court, 1914, PRAAD,
ADM 27/4/54, pp. 246–252.
54. ‘‘Coolie Labour’’, House of Commons Papers, Accounts and Papers (1906), pp. 1–50, 34.
Therefore, Herbert Bryan, the Acting Governor, argued, ‘‘labour is seldom ‘indentured’ in the
strict legal interpretation of the word’’.
55. ‘‘Rates of Wages and Cost of Living’’, Gold Coast Departmental Report for 1904, PRAAD,
ADM 5/1/13.
56. Akosua A. Perbi, A History of Indigenous Slavery in Ghana: From the 15th to the 19th
Century (Accra, 2004), pp. 49–50.
57. ‘‘Report on the Transport Department, 1903’’, Rhodes House Library, Oxford [hereafter,
RHO], 7ss.14 s.10.
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secure loans from individuals from the Fante coast of Ghana.58 This
option, nonetheless, proved of limited satisfaction. Labourers commonly
became discontented after a six-month period under such constraints.59
Having taken these limitations into account, one European employer
asserted, ‘‘I do not care that they be bound for longer, as much trouble
arises in consequence’’.60 Certainly, migrants could find ways to finance a
variety of entertainment: gambling, drinking, and sexual relationships.
Yet, there existed constant reminders of their bondage.
At the end of a contractual period, when the time came to hand over
payment, there also remained, as earlier implied, large scope for abuse
since all payments went through the headman.61 Referencing labour
contractors in South Africa around the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Alan Jeeves has posited that they ‘‘preferred this system rather
than that where the mine paid the workers directly because it enabled
them to discount wages in various surreptitious ways’’.62 In Ghana, some
headmen were just as conniving, managing to lengthen their men’s service
by continuously and strategically raising fines.63 In one especially bad
case, a particular headman refused payment to his entire gang after several
months of hard labour.64
These strategies of tying workers for (relatively) short terms were
pervasive throughout the recruitment process during the first years of the
twentieth century. Supported by collaborative mechanisms between
European employers and African headmen for the purpose of labour
recruitment, these schemes were not, however, carried out in a facile
manner with obedient followers, albeit perceived as ‘‘traditional’’. They
required a high level of financial and social management. Nevertheless,
indirect recruitment had a counteractive effect on the ambitions of con-
temporary ‘‘agents for change’’ for free labour. It obscured and weakened
such humanitarian efforts since headmen could solidify and enhance their
positions relative to the larger population of African workers. Considering
that under British protection no individuals were supposed to be working
under coercive conditions any longer, and at the very least they were to be
58. In a 1910 letter one headman complains about the damaging consequences of his men
taking credit from ‘‘Fanti’’ people; Letters from Natives of West Africa, 1904–34, Letter no. 3,
Essikadoe, Sekondi, 3 February 1910, RCMS 139/12/52.
59. ‘‘Report on the Transport Department, 1903’’, RHO, p. 472.
60. Ibid.
61. Criminal and Civil Record Book, District Commissioner’s Court, 16 April 1902, PRAAD,
ADM 27/4/43, pp. 330–331.
62. Alan Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa’s Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold
Mines’ Labour Supply, 1890–1920 (Kingston, ONT, 1985), p. 97.
63. ‘‘Tarquah Mining & Exploration Company v. Kukoboa’’, Criminal and Civil Record Book,
District Commissioner’s Court, 18 November 1909, PRAAD, ADM 27/4/48, pp. 762–763.
64. Ibid., pp. 297–299.
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working by agreement, an investigation launched by the House of
Commons into the state of these indentured labourers in 1906 indicates
that many Europeans still had major concerns about the virtues of the
gang system.65 The nature of relationships between members of a gang
remained hauntingly ambiguous. So, why did mine managers accept the
infusion of ‘‘traditional’’ authority into the labour process?
RELATIONS BETWEEN MINE MANAGERS AND HEADMEN
In the setting of the formative colonial state, Europeans relied on African
employees for a wide range of essential duties. According to Lawrance,
Osborn, and Roberts, these were Africans who ‘‘held positions that
bestowed little official authority, but in practice the occupants of these
positions functioned, somewhat paradoxically, as the hidden linchpins of
colonial rule’’.66 Europeans hired these men in spite of realizing that
African intermediaries would have to tackle the competing interests
of serving their professional appointments whilst also satisfying their
personal ambitions in the accumulation of power, wealth, and honour. In
modern industry too, they faced these challenges. Mine owners in early
colonial Ghana therefore had to negotiate their continual dependence on
the authority of these individuals for daily functions, with the long-term
goal of abolition and the spread of free wage labour.
Language barriers were one obstacle that few European officials, let
alone entrepreneurs, had the time or boldness to cross. In the formal
setting of the colonial state, such as offices and courts, European
employers could rely on educated African middlemen, who sometimes
spoke multiple European languages along with indigenous ones. Also in
the wide and often tumultuous landscape of the goldmines, managers
were incapable of looking over the shoulders of all the men working on a
single concession. Difficulties in controlling the often hundreds of
workers were multiplied as European mine managers had to deal with a
wide range of languages and dialects. Thus, to minimize some of these
problems within the organizational hierarchy in the mines, managers
required that their headmen spoke at least some English, perhaps just
enough to give and take orders.67
Keeping track of workers alone was a daunting task for mine managers,
who often lacked an overview of the individuals in their employment at a
65. ‘‘Coolie Labour’’, pp. 1, 34–35.
66. Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts (eds), Intermediaries,
Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa (Madison, WI,
2006), p. 4.
67. Official Correspondence and Papers, Gold Coast Transport Department, 2 December 1904,
RCMS 139/11/8.
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given time and in a given place. This issue remained infinitely more dif-
ficult where the workers were predominantly subcontracted, as opposed
to having individual contracts under the Master and Servant Ordinance of
1893.68 Individual registrations would have been costly and the colonial
government continuously dodged shouldering such a burden. Instead,
they pointed to the lack of cooperation between mines as the origin of the
continual desertion problem. Administrators were certainly not con-
vinced of the benefits of a fixed class of wage earners. This was, after all, a
period in which colonial institutions were already stretched thin. Indeed,
they could barely monitor who was entering and leaving the colony
throughout the year. As a result, the difficulties of labour supervision
grew proportionately with the number of African workers put to work.
Given the frequent and widespread turnover in labourers, at least on an
annual basis, this problem would not necessarily improve with time. In
1905, in neighbouring Asante, for example, a mine manager noticed to his
own terror that ‘‘there was a much larger number of natives employed
[there] than [they] had any idea of owing to the system of contracts
whereby only one name appeared on the books’’.69
If European employers were not even clear about who was part of the
workforce in their own companies, there was hardly any chance of them
exercising adequate supervision themselves. This should not imply that
the benefits of more extensive supervision by Europeans over single gang
units were not regularly discussed.70 Still, the financial burden of imple-
menting such an operation remained unsustainable. The manpower was
simply not available at a reasonable cost. In actuality, aside from senior
management, white staffers generally also worked on an annual basis in
administrative jobs in accounting, or technical jobs such as surveying.
Moreover, there were usually only two mine captains under the direction
of a chief mine captain. They were the ones in charge of supervising the
68. Around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some workers from Nigeria and
Sierra Leone executed contracts under the Master and Servant Ordinance for roughly six
months. However, predominantly Liberian Kru workers were ‘‘enlisted in their own country
informally, and the agreement [was] properly drawn up under the Master and Servant Ordi-
nance on their arrival in this Colony’’. This generally obligated them to twelve months of
service. Arriving on steamboats at Sekondi, they were much easier to capture and register by
local district commissioners before they made their way up to Tarkwa; Migeod to Governor
Rodgers, 28 April 1906.
69. ‘‘Report by Mr. Mann’’, Mines Correspondence Inwards, 10 January 1905, London
Metropolitan Archives, Ms 14171 v.11, pp. 48–54.
70. Migeod asserted that ‘‘the value of a gang of labourers varies with the ability of the Eur-
opean in charge. One will condemn a gang as worthless, while another will get most excellent
result out of it. Probably under efficient supervision, or if possible working on a fair system of
daily task work, a day’s work will be performed at will for the expenditure compared
favourably with that of an unskilled labour in other countries’’; ‘‘Report on the Transport
Department, 1903’’, p. 472.
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activities of roughly 100 to 200 underground miners, who laboured in the
extraction and hauling of ore, as well as surface miners, who worked in
the various mills spread across a concession. Reducing the chance of
adequate surveillance even further, among the handful of staff at each
individual mine there was a frequent rotation of white men having to
take to their sickbeds due to the harsh rural environment.71 In practice,
European supervision in the mining industry was no more than a delicate
‘‘thin white line’’.72
As a consequence of the practical limitations of European supervision,
during the height of headship, in 1904, it was suggested that to avoid
desertions ‘‘a native (who would more easily recognize native faces than a
European) could be employed, constantly inspecting labourers at the dif-
ferent mines, paying special attention to all newcomers’’.73 Additional lines
of inspection by Africans would also have the effect of curbing the illegal
activities of African clerks, who were suspected of producing artificial names
on the timesheets, and later withdrawing the earnings of these dummy
employees.74 To this purpose, managers at the Ashanti mine contemplated
the employment of four junior clerks. However, by and large, individual
headmen administered other African wage earners and stood as their prin-
cipal barrier to desertion. In fact, when there were runaways, headmen were
first in charge of searching for and collecting these absconders.75
After carefully examining the devices that mine managers in south-west
Ghana utilized to regulate labour migration, Raymond Dumett put
forward the view that, contrary to the South African case around that
period, they did not manufacture a system of oscillatory migration as a
means of influx control.76 ‘‘Rather they relied on it because it was the only
71. Dumett claimed that ‘‘rotating field management, the inevitable result of illness, frequent
rest leaves, and convalescences in Europe, which saddled [mines] with heavy operating costs
and destroyed continuity in administration’’ debilitated mine management in nineteenth-
century Wassa; Dumett, El Dorado, p. 207.
72. Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Madison, WI, 1993); Anthony Kirk-Greene, ‘‘The Thin White Line: The Size of
the British Colonial Service in Africa’’, African Affairs, 79 (1980), pp. 25–44.
73. Griffith to Migeod, 25 March 1904.
74. For example, in the case against John D. Coleman and William Dunn it was alleged that
‘‘they on about Feb. 26th [and] April 1st 1916 at Abbontiakoon in the Tarquah district did
obtain the sum of £1-12-10 [and] £1-14-8 from Abbontiakoon by falsely pretending that one
Kwaku, a labourer in the Abbontiakoon Mine, worked during the months of February [and]
March 1916 whereas [y] in fact he had not worked during those months.’’ Both men pleaded
guilty; 6 May 1916, PRAAD, ADM 27/4/56, p. 595.
75. ‘‘Aufargah Mutiny’’, 9 October 1903.
76. Following Dumett, the narrative of ‘‘cheap labour theory’’ does not fit the case of nine-
teenth-century colonial Ghana. He has convincingly argued that there is no indication that
mine managers deliberately constructed a non-permanent migrant labour force to lower wages
and to enhance labour control; Dumett, El Dorado, pp. 224–225, 233.
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alternative’’.77 In reality, the majority of European companies struggled to
retain workers, in particular those engaged in underground mining. An
irregular labour market ‘‘cost them far too much money in lost time and
skills and the continuous training of new workers’’.78 In the long term,
most workers were not dependent on wage labour for their reproduction,
and their freedom to sell their labour power to whomever they desired
kept wage rates comparatively high. To make things worse, as mentioned
earlier, mining companies failed to cooperate with each other, probably
because they had no support from the state when it came to solving the
free-rider problem, i.e. in policing agreements among companies. Rather,
these entrepreneurs used various shrewd tactics to steal workers from
one another, often employing the services of labour recruiters to get men
from neighbouring concessions with the attraction of better pay and food.
This threat was particularly acute in the first weeks of employment, when
workers still had credits to pay off.79 Although African workers had
mixed incentives to work for wages, a (more) regular workforce was of
high priority for most businessmen.
Consequently, during the mining boom in early twentieth-century Ghana,
the industry fostered institutions led by headmen that became a pivotal part
of managerial strategies. By now it had become noticeably easier for men to
enter the wage labour market as a member of a gang, as opposed to on an
individual basis.80 Naturally, some wage labourers did travel to find work in
the gold mines by themselves.81 However, given that nobody was sufficiently
familiar with them to vouch for them or to supervise and protect them,
European employers believed that they were much more likely to abscond
from their contracts, leaving behind outstanding debts, and forcing compa-
nies to acquire replacements. The gang system aligned smoothly with
widespread contemporary European perceptions of ‘‘traditional’’ African
culture, which was based on small-scale tribal society. Individual labourers
generally fell under the undesirable and suspicious category of ‘‘casual
labourer’’. Gangs, by contrast, promised stability and order.
The incorporation of this modified form of ‘‘traditional’’ African
authority at once aided early industrialization and made more elusive a
comprehensive ‘‘market-oriented’’ approach to economic development
77. Ibid., pp. 269–270.
78. Rumsey (1882) in ibid., p. 270.
79. According to the Chief Officer of the Transport Department, it was ‘‘exceptionally rare’’
for a labourer to desert after several months of work; Letter Book, July–December 1903, RCMS
139/4/75.
80. Uttering his dislike for casual labourers, one administrative official complained: ‘‘They stay
with an employer so long as it suits them and when the inclination takes them to make a change
they merely await pay day to leave’’; Migeod to Governor Rodgers, 28 April 1906.
81. Individual workers from Sierra Leone and Nigeria were reputed to travel to Ghana ‘‘on
their own initiative’’ to look for jobs; ibid.
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in Ghana. This was because the type of ‘‘progress’’ that was occurring in
the mining industry around the early twentieth century modified labour
relations in ways that increasingly followed market principles, but also
remained based on social incentives. Employers’ incorporation of insti-
tutions into industry, as opposed to individuals, would perpetuate a
growing yet undifferentiated market for wage labourers.
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether they embraced indirect recruit-
ment as a best practice for a tribal society, for most managers around the
early 1900s it was merely a temporary solution which detracted from their
long-term objective of better-organized management of wage earners in
the colony, with the assistance of state law.82 In other words, only as long
as radical intervention in the lives of African workers was not a priority of
the administration would most businessmen continue to respond crudely
to the conditions of the labour market.
CONCLUSION
The urgent expansion of modern enterprise in Ghana overlapped in time
with the slow death of slavery and bonded labour. Yet, the existing lit-
erature on industrial labour in Ghana has overlooked the persistence of
social hierarchies as it transpired between labourers in modern industry,
following the emancipation of slaves. As African colonial employees in
the ‘‘industrialized’’ mining sector, headmen initially emerged as labour
recruiters and contractors in the Tarkwa region when European mine
managers and officials, pressurized by labour shortages during a boom
period, were unable to bring large numbers of young men into the labour
market with wage incentives. These intermediaries were responsible for
recruiting thousands of labourers from within an expansive West African
network. Although they would lose influence with time, in the earliest
decades of industrialization these types of African authorities enjoyed
extraordinary autonomy over the larger population of African workers.
In contrast to African colonial employees in government houses, i.e.
educated Africans, the headmen derived power from home ties. Mine
managers depended on these supposedly ‘‘traditional’’ authorities as they
could use their relationships to mobilize other African workers.
It is unclear what percentage of these recruits were slaves. However,
modern enterprise certainly adapted to a market wherein African workers
82. The Mine Managers’ Association, a collective body of Tarkwa managers founded in 1902,
attempted in vain to convince the government to approve the mandatory individual registration
of workers in their centres. The Concession Labour Bill sought to curb desertion and other
irregularities consistent with the lack of oversight of the workforce at the time; ‘‘Concession
Labour Ordinance’’, Press Copy Book, 3 December 1903; RCMS 139/4/57. See also R.G.
Thomas, ‘‘Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of the Northern Territories of the
Gold Coast 1906–1927’’, Journal of African History, 14 (1973), pp. 79–103, 80, 87.
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were driven by mixed incentives, some of which remained coercive in
nature. An even closer look at indirect recruitment and subcontract
labour further reveals that African authority, rooted in the home villages,
not only remained relevant, but was further strengthened as it was built
into managerial strategies. A novel feature of the modern industrial
economy, headmen managed to acquire additional personal security and
power through the formal and informal structures surrounding the
organization in the mines, as they positioned themselves with European
employers as natural leaders of ‘‘rural’’ societies.
Indeed, indirect recruitment for the purpose of colonial commodity
capitalism mirrored colonial policies of administrative indirect rule in
many ways, as social control in the mines was enacted through modified
forms of African ‘‘customs’’ and ‘‘traditions’’, whether invented, imagined,
or simply practised. Nevertheless, greater emphasis ought to be placed on
the recognition that headship was modelled on a system of contested
mutual rights and obligations between people as had existed in older
times, as opposed to one hinging solely on natural submission. Caretaking
and supervision were the rewards for loyalty and hard work. Further,
both parties remained in a vulnerable situation due to shifts in debts
and finances.
Similarly, the ‘‘pulling and tugging’’ that occurred within the vertical
political relationships between European businessmen in colonial Africa
and their indigenous intermediaries was certainly not hegemonic.83 Some
managers may have preferred to use modified forms of pre-industrial
productive relations. However, it is unclear whether they could intervene
in a radical fashion: whether any amount of investment in the mining
industry would have sufficiently affected the contemporary state of the
labour force, and, more significantly, the socio-political dynamics defin-
ing it. Rather, as a system of new rule, headship seems to have resulted
from a pragmatic assessment of the condition of the labour market, where
British industrial employers had little other choice.
In south-west Ghana, the ‘‘paradox’’ of allegiances between African
intermediaries and European employers was that they simultaneously
served to expand colonial commerce and to restrict the growth of free
labour. On the one hand, it was the headmen’s embeddedness within rural
networks, and older types of socio-economic institution, that made them
fundamental to industrial labour recruitment. On the other hand, it was
the enhancement of their powers within such institutions that made them
a threat to radical economic transformation and humanitarian ambitions,
83. In his introduction to Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 14, Cooper
describes the study of intermediaries as that ‘‘of people pushing and tugging on relationships
with those above and below them, changing but only sometimes breaking the lines of
authority’’.
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as a considerable segment of the African labour force would remain
directly accountable to other Africans, and not to European employers.
Social submissions were reproduced. As a consequence, the colonial state
would invest much time and effort in regulating indirect recruitment,
rather than directly empowering and policing workers. This was the
‘‘bargain’’ of collaboration as manifested in the modern industry of early
colonial Ghana.
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